# Public consultation on strengthening the quality of corporate reporting and its enforcement

#### Introduction

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High quality and reliable corporate reporting is of key importance for healthy financial markets, business investment and economic growth. The <u>EU corporate reporting framework</u> should ensure that companies publish the right quantity and quality of relevant information allowing investors and other interested stakeholders to assess the company's performance and governance and to take decisions based on it. High quality reporting is also indispensable for cross-border investments and the development of the capital markets union (CMU).

In the context of this consultation, corporate reporting comprises the financial statements of companies, their management report that includes the non-financial and corporate governance statements and country-by-country reporting. It would also include sustainability information pursuant to the <u>proposed Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive</u>.

The consultation takes into account the outcomes of the 2018 consultation on the EU framework for public reporting by companies and the 2021 fitness check on the EU framework for public reporting by companies. This consultation however focuses on companies listed on EU regulated markets (hereafter 'listed companies' or 'issuers'), that is a subset of the companies subject to public reporting requirements under EU law. Please note that in terms of reporting, this consultation does not seek the views of stakeholders on the applicable accounting standards, such as International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) or the standards in the Accounting Directive, or the views of stakeholders on public country-by-country reporting or the Commission's proposal for a Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive.

The 2018 consultation did not cover the areas of corporate governance or statutory audit. Therefore, this consultation contains questions to evaluate aspects of the <u>Audit Regulation 537/2014</u>, <u>Audit Directive 2006/43/EC</u> and of <u>Accounting Directive 2013/34/EU</u>. However, it covers the EU framework on corporate governance only in so far as relevant for corporate reporting by listed companies and the statutory audit of so-called public interest entities (PIEs). Listed companies, credit institutions, insurance undertakings and entities designated as such by Member States are PIEs.

This consultation also builds on the work carried out by the <u>European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA)</u> and the Committee of European Audit Oversight Bodies (CEAOB).

This consultation is divided into 5 parts

- The first part seeks your views about the overall impact of the EU framework on the three pillars of high quality and reliable corporate reporting - corporate governance, statutory audit and supervision. It also seeks your views about the interaction between the three pillars
- The second part of the questionnaire focuses on the corporate governance pillar, as far as relevant for corporate reporting. It aims to get your feedback in particular on the functioning of company boards, audit committees and your views on how to improve their functioning
- The third part focuses on the statutory <u>audit pillar</u>. The first questions in this part aim at getting your views on the
  effectiveness, efficiency and coherence of the EU audit framework. It focuses in particular on the changes
  brought by the <u>2014 audit reform</u>. Subsequently, the questions aim to seek views on how to improve the
  functioning of statutory audit
- The fourth part asks questions about the supervision of PIE statutory auditors and audit firms
- Finally, the consultation will ask questions about the supervision of corporate reporting and how to improve it

This consultation will directly feed into an impact assessment that the Commission will prepare in 2022 with a view to possibly amend and strengthen the current EU rules.

Please note: In order to ensure a fair and transparent consultation process only responses received through our online questionnaire will be taken into account and included in the report summarising the responses. Should you have a problem completing this questionnaire or if you require particular assistance, please contact <a href="mailto:fisma-corporate-reporting@ec.europa.eu">fisma-corporate-reporting@ec.europa.eu</a>.

More information on

- this consultation
- the consultation document
- the consultation strategy
- company reporting
- the protection of personal data regime for this consultation

### Part I - The EU framework for high quality and reliable corporate reporting

The EU framework for corporate reporting has developed significantly since the EU adopted the <u>fourth company law Directive (Directive 78/660/EEC)</u> which coordinated the national provisions on the presentation, content and publication of annual accounts and management reports of limited liability companies. This Directive also already required a statutory audit of the annual accounts of limited liability companies.

Today, the <u>Accounting Directive 2013/34/EU</u>, the <u>Statutory Audit Directive (2006/43/EU</u>) and <u>Audit Regulation (537/2014)</u> and the <u>Transparency Directive 2004/109/EC</u> provide the main requirements that ensure the quality of corporate reporting and its enforcement in the EU. Moreover, the <u>ESMA Regulation (EU)1095/2010</u> gives tasks to ESMA in relation to corporate reporting. Given the inclusion of the Transparency Directive in the scope of the ESMA Regulation ESMA can make use of its powers in the ESMA Regulation, such as to issue guidelines.

The main elements of this framework that guarantee the quality and reliability of corporate reporting can be summarised as follows

- Corporate governance:

  Responsibility of company boards for corporate reporting; the establishment by PIE's of an audit committee to
  - Responsibility of company boards for corporate reporting; the establishment by PIE's of an audit committee to minimise risks and to enhance the quality of financial reporting
- A u d i t :

  The requirements for a statutory audit of the annual accounts to ensure that there are no material misstatements
- S u p e r v i s i o n :
   The supervision of statutory auditors and audit firms to ensure the quality of audits and the supervision of corporate reporting by listed companies to ensure the quality of corporate reporting

The three pillars of the corporate reporting framework can be mutually reinforcing. At the same time, weaknesses in one pillar also negatively impact other pillars. Appropriate responsibilities and supervision of company boards provide incentives to company boards to focus on the quality of their corporate reporting. It will also incentivise them to see statutory audit not as a burden, but as an important external check by statutory auditors. On the other hand, where company boards are insufficiently accountable and supervised, there is a risk that boards may pay insufficient attention to the quality of reporting and that they provide insufficient resources for a proper audit.

Question 1. As a user of corporate reporting (retail or wholesale investor, credit rating agency, NGO, public authority, employees, suppliers, other stakeholders), what is the relative importance of the information contained therein compared to other sources of information?

- 1 Very low
- 2 Low
- 3 Medium
- 4 High
- 5 Very high
- Don't know / no opinion / not applicable

Question 2. How do you assess the overall effectiveness, efficiency, relevance, coherence and EU added value of the EU legislation, considering each of the pillars underpinning corporate reporting individually, but also in combination with each other?

#### a) Corporate governance

	<b>1</b> (very low)	2 (low)	3 (medium)	4 (high)	<b>5</b> (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness in reaching its objectives	0	•	•	•	•	•
II. Efficiency: has the framework been cost efficient	•	•	•	•	•	•
III. Relevant in terms of overall needs and objectives	•	•	•	•		•
IV. Coherence with other related EU frameworks / internal coherence			•	•		•
V. EU Added value: was and is EU intervention justified?	•	•	•	•	•	•

#### b) Statutory audit

	<b>1</b> (very low)	2 (low)	3 (medium)	4 (high)	<b>5</b> (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness in reaching its objectives	•	0	0	•	•	•

II. Efficiency: has the framework been cost efficient	©	<b>©</b>	©	©	©	•
III. Relevant in terms of overall needs and objectives	•	•	•	•	•	•
IV. Coherence with other related EU frameworks / internal coherence	•	•	•	•		•
V. EU Added value: was and is EU intervention justified?	©	©	•	©	©	•

#### c) Supervision by public authorities of statutory auditors/audit firms

	<b>1</b> (very low)	2 (low)	3 (medium)	4 (high)	5 (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness in reaching its objectives	0	0	•	0	0	•
II. Efficiency: has the framework been cost efficient	•	•	•	•	•	•
III. Relevant in terms of	©	©	•	©	©	0

overall needs and objectives						
IV. Coherence with other related EU frameworks / internal coherence	•	•	•	•	•	•
V. EU Added value: was and is EU intervention justified?	•	•	•	•		•

#### d) Supervision by authorities of corporate reporting

	<b>1</b> (very low)	2 (low)	3 (medium)	4 (high)	5 (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness in reaching its objectives	•	•	•	•	•	•
II. Efficiency: has the framework been cost efficient			•	•		•
III. Relevant in terms of overall needs and objectives	•	•	•	•	•	•
IV. Coherence with other related EU frameworks / internal coherence	•		•	•		•

V. EU Added value: was and is EU intervention justified?	•	•	•	•	©	©

#### e) The eco-system composed of all of the above

	<b>1</b> (very low)	2 (low)	3 (medium)	4 (high)	5 (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness in reaching its objectives	•	•	•	•	•	•
II. Efficiency: has the framework been cost efficient	•	•	•	•	•	•
III. Relevant in terms of overall needs and objectives	•	•	•	•	•	•
IV. Coherence with other related EU frameworks / internal coherence	•	•	•	•	•	•
V. EU Added value: was and is EU intervention justified?	•	•	•	•	•	•

Question 2.1 Please describe the main issues that you see, if any, in the four areas mentioned in question 2 and in the eco-system composed of all four areas. Where possible, please provide concrete examples and evidence supporting your assessment.

You may want to consider the following aspects

- have any factors reduced the effectiveness / rendered the relevant EU framework less effective than anticipated? Which rules have proven less effective than anticipated?
- is there room to improve efficiency via further simplification?
- are existing provisions coherent with each other?

2000 character(s) maximum

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

We agree that the main objective of a high quality and reliable corporate reporting framework should be to ensure that companies publish the right quantity and quality of relevant, comparable and assurable information in order to allow investors and other interested stakeholders to assess the company's performance and governance, and to take informed decisions based on it.

We also share the European Commission's view that corporate reporting should be seen as part of a wider ecosystem, and therefore welcome the scope of the EC consultation around three pillars: corporate governance, statutory audit and supervision.

However, it is vital to connect reporting requirements with other policy levers to ensure that business resources are not focused on reporting compliance but on transforming business models for a just and green transition, implementing credible strategies that support sustainable value creation, engendering trust and confidence in them.

To prevent different kinds of expectations gaps, it is important that the role of the actors in the corporate reporting ecosystem is well understood. If not, it should be clearly explained in the EU framework.

The <u>ESMA report on enforcement and regulatory activities of European enforcers in</u> 2020 notes that supervisors undertook the examination that year of 729 financial statements drawn up in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Based on these examinations, European enforcers took enforcement actions against 265 issuers in order to address material departures from IFRS. This represents an action rate of 38%.

As regards the audit sector the <u>Commission's market monitoring report</u> highlights deficiencies in audit firms' internal quality control systems, but also in individual files for audits of PIEs. National audit oversight bodies also report that part of statutory audits is not up to standards.

Question 3. Based on your own experience how do you assess the quality and reliability of corporate reporting by listed EU companies?

- 1 Very low 2 - Low 3 - Medium
- 4 High
- 5 Very high
- Don't know / no opinion / not applicable

Question 3.1 Please provide concrete examples and evidence supporting your assessment in question 3 and explain the consequences that the quality and reliability of corporate reporting or lack thereof has on you.

2000 character(s) maximum

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

Reliable corporate reporting is vital to well-functioning financial markets, business investment and growth. However, the practice is showing that there is no consistent supervision on the audit profession, audit committees or corporate reporting in the Member States. This currently comes at the cost of the perceived reliability of all corporate reporting by all investors.

Mentioning another problem is that the management reports of European listed companies often lack a balance between favourable elements and unfavourable elements, including candid descriptions of incidents, i.e. what still went wrong despite all efforts in managing risks.

Sustainability information is not globally comparable, due to the lack of enforceable international sustainability reporting standards. The lack of enforceable sustainability reporting standards also hampers auditing.

Question 4. There are no generally accepted standards or indicators to measure the quality of corporate reporting and of statutory audit, nor the effectiveness of supervision. In light of this, what are your views on the following questions?

	<b>1</b> (strongly disagree)	2 (rather disagree)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather agree)	5 (strongly agree)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
Would it be useful to have specific indicators to measure the quality of corporate reporting, of statutory audits and the effectiveness of supervision?	0	•	•	•	0	0
Is it possible to have clear and reliable indicators to measure the quality of corporate reporting, of statutory audit and the effectiveness of supervision?	0	0	0	•	0	0
Should the European Commission develop indicators on the quality of corporate reporting, of statutory audits and the effectiveness of supervision?	0	•	0	0	0	0

Question 4.1 Please provide any further explanation supporting your views, and, where relevant, please suggest possible indicators of the quality and reliability of corporate reporting, statutory audit and supervision, where possible with concrete examples:

2000 character(s) maximum

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

ST is supportive of quality indicators for corporate reporting, statutory audit and supervision. However, for them to be effective, efficient and relevant, they should be developed on a multi-stakeholder basis. Setting up KPI:s or QI:s only for the sake of the indicators, i.e. without carefully considering the aim, objectives and intended behaviour, is not efficient. Generally however, justified and well-thought performance indicators could be an efficient way to increase quality. This would require input and involvement of the respective parties to be efficient and to the target.

The audit profession is currently implementing the new robust International Standard on Quality Management 1 (ISQM1), focused on achieving quality objectives through identifying and responding to quality risks. This will further enhance internal quality control or management within audit firms.

Question 5. In your view, should the Commission take action in the areas of the corporate governance pillar, the statutory audit pillar, the supervision of PIE auditors and audit firms and the supervision of corporate reporting to increase the quality and reliability of reporting by listed companies?

- Yes, there is a need to improve the some or all of the areas listed above
- Yes, there is a need to improve some or all of the areas listed above as well as other areas
- No, but there is a need to improve other areas than those listed above
- No, there is no need to take further action in any area
- Don't know / no opinion / not applicable

Please indicate to what extent you think the Commission should take action in each of the areas below to increase the quality and reliability of reporting by listed companies:

	<b>1</b> (strongly disagree)	2 (rather disagree)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather agree)	5 (strongly agree)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
Improve the corporate governance pillar	0	0	0	•	0	0
Improve the statutory audit pillar	0	0	•	0	0	0
Improve the supervision of PIE auditors and audit firms	0	0	•	0	0	0
Improve the supervision of corporate reporting	0	0	•	0	0	0

## Question 5.1 Please provide any further explanation supporting your views, and where appropriate describe what actions you would prioritise and why, with concrete examples:

2000 character(s) maximum

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

The annual report of all European listed companies should include a statement by the board that the internal risk management and control systems provide reasonable assurance that the financial reporting does not contain any material inaccuracies ('in control statement'). This will increase investor trust in the quality and reliability of financial reporting.

All large European listed entities (more than 500 employees) should be obliged to establish an internal audit function in order to strengthen the internal 'lines of defense'.

### Question 5.2 At what level should action be taken to improve the quality of corporate governance, audit, audit supervision and/or supervision of corporate reporting?

	<b>1</b> (strongly disagree)	2 (rather disagree)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather agree)	5 (strongly agree)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
Companies themselves should take action to improve their reporting	0	0	0	0	•	•
Auditors themselves should take action to improve audits	0	0	0	•	0	0
Audit supervisors themselves should take action to improve their functioning	•	•	0	•	0	0
Individual Member States should take action if the situation in their market requires this	0	0	0	0	•	0
The EU should take action	0	0	•	0	0	0
Several of the above should take action	0	0	0	0	0	0

### Question 5.3 Please provide any further explanation supporting your views expressed in question 5.2:

2000 character(s) maximum

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

Due to the high degree of differences between corporate governance regimes between Member States, retaining the supervision on national corporate governance requirements should be considered. Also top-ups for corporate governance reporting requirements should be required for large EU listed companies.

### Question 6. To what extent is there a need to modify the EU framework on corporate reporting to support the following objectives?

	1 (not at all necessary)	2 (rather not necessary)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather necessary)	5 (highly necessary)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. The green transition	0	0	0	0	•	0
II. The digital transition	0	0	0	0	•	0
III. Facilitating doing business by SMEs	0	0	0	•	0	0
IV. Reducing burdens and/or simplification	0	0	0	0	•	0
V. Better corporate social responsibility, including tax transparency and fair taxation	0	0	0	0	•	0

### Question 6.1 Please provide, if needed, any further explanation supporting your views expressed in question 6:

2000 character(s) maximum

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

We find that is is of extremely high importance, that the EU framework on corporate reporting is aligning with the global baseline for sustainability reporting set by IFRS Foundation's International Sustainability Standards Board.

#### Part II - Corporate governance

The EU corporate governance framework focuses on the relationships between company boards, shareholders and other stakeholders, and therefore, on the way a company is managed and controlled. The framework consists of a combination of EU and Member State legislation and soft law, namely national corporate governance codes applied on a 'comply or explain' basis. It aims inter alia to provide protection for shareholders and other parties with a particular interest in companies, such as employees and creditors.

A <u>sustainable corporate governance initiative</u> is planned to be adopted by the Commission in 2021. (In addition, the <u>Commission's study on directors' duties and sustainable corporate governance, July 20</u>20, assesses the root causes of 'short termism' in corporate governance and discusses their relationship with current market practices and/or regulatory frameworks).

Key features of the EU framework on corporate governance that are relevant for corporate reporting are

- The collective responsibility of the members of the administrative, management and supervisory bodies of a company for drawing up and publishing annual financial statements and management reports
- The requirement for a statement by the persons responsible within the issuer that, to the best of their knowledge, the financial statements prepared give a true and fair view of the assets, liabilities, financial position and profit or loss of the issuer
- The requirement for PIEs to establish, in principle, an audit committee

Question 7. How do you assess the effectiveness, efficiency, and coherence of the key features of the EU framework on corporate governance, considering how they underpin quality and reliability of corporate reporting?

#### a) Board responsibilities for reporting

	1 (very low)	2 (low)	3 (medium)	4 (high)	5 (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness						

in reaching its objectives		©	0	•	0	0
II. Efficiency: has the framework been cost efficient			•	•	•	•
III. Coherence with relevant EU rules	•	•	•	•	•	0

#### b) Liability of company boards for reporting

	<b>1</b> (very low)	2 (low)	3 (medium)	4 (high)	5 (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness in reaching its objectives	0	0	•	•	0	0
II. Efficiency: has the framework been cost efficient	•	•	•	•	•	•
III. Coherence with relevant EU rules	0	0	•	•	0	0

#### c) Obligation to establish an audit committee

	1 (very low)	2 (low)	3 (medium)	4 (high)	5 (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness						

in reaching its objectives	0	•	©	©	©	
II. Efficiency: has the framework been cost efficient		•	•	•	•	0
III. Coherence with relevant EU rules	•	•	0	0	0	•

#### d) Rules on the composition of the audit committee

	1 (very low)	2 (low)	3 (medium)	4 (high)	5 (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness in reaching its objectives	•	0	•	0	0	•
II. Efficiency: has the framework been cost efficient	•	0	•	0		•
III. Coherence with relevant EU rules	•	0	0	0	0	•

#### e) Tasks of the audit committee

	1 (very low)	2 (low)	3 (medium)	4 (high)	5 (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness						

in reaching its objectives	0	©	©	•	©	0
II. Efficiency: has the framework been cost efficient	•	•	•	•	•	•
III. Coherence with relevant EU rules	©	•	0	•	0	0

#### f) External position of the audit committee (e.g. in relation to shareholders)

	1 (very low)	2 (low)	3 (medium)	4 (high)	5 (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness in reaching its objectives	•	•	•	•	•	•
II. Efficiency: has the framework been cost efficient	•	•	•	•	•	•
III. Coherence with relevant EU rules	0	•	0	0	©	0

Question 7.1 Please describe the main issues you see, if any, as regards corporate governance and, where possible, please provide concrete examples and evidence supporting your assessment.

You may want to consider the following aspects

- are there factors that have reduced the effectiveness / rendered the relevant EU framework less effective than anticipated? Which rules have proven less effective than anticipated?
- is there room to improve efficiency via further simplification?
- are existing provisions coherent with each other?

2000 character(s) maximum

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

Company law should be considered in a broader perspective, not only from the view of the boards responsibilities for reporting. Several legal measures have been adopted or are proposed, such as the Taxonomy Regulation, the Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation and the proposal for Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive, which address corporate short-termism and try to promote the governance of firms. Focusing should be on the full implementation and enforcement of these measures.

Audit committee responsibilities vary widely between member states, across jurisdictions, sectors and between companies. It is important to recognize that there is no one-size-fits-all model for audit committees and therefore enhancing their effectiveness will be more dependent on adoption of good practices rather than further prescriptive legislation or additional regulatory scrutiny. The country specific corporate governance codes based on soft law are the best complement to a heavy non workable one-size-fits-all model.

The tasks of the audit committee can be conducted by a distinct audit committee, by another body or the board of directors of the audited entity in Finland. Referring to a study undertaken by the FIN-FSA and Finnish Patent Registration Office (PRH), the biggest challenges for audit committees in Finnish companies relate to continuously changing legislation and to workload.

Boards and audit committees should have clear and collective responsibilities, including for risk management and oversight of internal controls over financial reporting. This requires having adequate competences and expertise as well as independence for audit committees. In this sense, the auditor shall communicate key matters arising from the statutory audit and on material weaknesses in internal controls regarding the financial reporting process.

Question 8. Considering the level of material departures from IFRS reported in the <u>ESMA report on enforcement and regulatory activities of Europe</u>an <u>enforcers in 202</u>0, to what extent can such departures be attributed to deficiencies of the EU framework on corporate governance?

1 - Not at all
2 - To a limited extent
3 - To some extent
4 - To a large extent
5 - To a very large extent
Don't know / no opinion / not applicable

### Question 8.1 Please explain the main issues you see, and, where possible, please provide concrete examples and evidence supporting your assessment:

2000 character(s) maximum

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

This assessment should be made by national supervisory authorities and ESMA.

However, the amount of material departures in the ESMA report is a reflection of the divergence of consistency in oversight and reporting by the regulators, and this is not supporting the goal to increase the attractiveness of Europe's capital market for domestic and international investors and issuers.

Question 9. How effective and efficient would the following actions be in increasing the quality and reliability of reporting by listed companies?

### a) Strengthen the (collective) responsibilities of the board / tasks for reporting / liability of boards for incorrect reporting

	not at all effective/efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	0	•	0	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	0	•	0	0

b) Require proper expertise of specific board members in relation to corporate reporting (internal controls, accounting framework, sustainability reporting, etc.)

	not at all effective/efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	0	0	•	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	0	0	•	0

### c) Increase the responsibilities of specific board members (e.g. Chief Executive Officer or the Chief Financial Officer) and their liability on corporate reporting

	not at all effective/efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	•	0	0	0	0	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	•	0	0	0	0	0

d) Give company boards an explicit responsibility to establish effective risk management and internal control systems for the preparation of corporate reporting, including as regards controls for risks of fraud and going concern

	not at all effective/efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	0	0	•	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	0	0	•	0

### e) More transparency of company boards about the effectiveness of the companies' risk management and report on the actions undertaken during the reporting period

	not at all effective/efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	0	0	•	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	0	0	•	0

#### f) Remove exemptions in EU legislation for establishing an audit committee

	(not at all effective/ efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	0	0	•	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	0	0	•	0

### g) Increase the tasks of the audit committee, e.g. for providing assurance on internal control systems for the avoidance of risk and fraud and going concern

	not at all effective/efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	0	•	0	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	0	•	0	0

### h) Strengthen the external position of the audit committee (e.g. vis-à-vis the auditor or by reporting to shareholders)

	not at all effective/efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	0	0	•	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	0	0	•	0

i) Require the setting up of specific whistle blowing procedures inside listed companies and supervisors of corporate reporting to strengthen the protection of whistle blowers

	not at all effective/efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	•	0	0	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	•	0	0	0

j) Require auditors to provide assurance on the systems and internal controls implemented by the board, including fraud, going concern and related reporting requirements

	not at all effective/efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	0	0	•	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	0	0	0	•

#### k) Strengthen the role of shareholders on corporate reporting

	not at all effective/efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	•	0	0	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	•	0	0	0

## Question 9.1 Have you identified other actions that would effectively and efficiently increase the quality and reliability of reporting by listed companies?

- Yes
- O No
- Don't know / no opinion / not applicable

### 9.1.1 Please specify to what other action(s) you refer in your answer to question 9.1:

2000 character(s) maximum

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

We see that minimum requirements for the contents of the report of the Audit Committee would strongly enhance the financial and sustainability reporting. As audit committee reporting may be increasing, the usefulness of disclosures varies if there is no requirements for the content.

We welcome the EU Whistle-blowers Protection Directive and look forward to observing the improvements it will bring. To start investigations in a timely manner, early

providers of information (whistleblowers) must be heard by the relevant parties and be taken seriously. We see benefits by developing a supervisory strategy allowing for an effective screening of the many voices raised and encouraging whistleblowing from within or outside publicly listed firm.

### Question 9.2 Please provide any details to support your views. Any evidence, including on expected benefits and costs of such action is welcome:

2000 character(s) maximum

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

Audit committees play an important role in the corporate reporting ecosystem. Increased transparency on how an audit committee has discharged its duties is crucial and enables a more informed assessment of its performance and effectiveness. Due to this we would like to suggest in option h, that the audit committee shall have an obligation to provide insightful information on its main conducted activities in the audit committee report. For example, what challenges were addressed in the reporting year, what challenges still remain for the coming year(s) and what was the company's response to these remarks and recommendations.

We also see the benefits that all PIEs should have audit committee with a sufficient number of members with competence in accounting, auditing and internal controls and, in the case of large PIEs, it should be supported by an independent internal audit function and well-established whistle blowing structures. Furthermore, audit committees should monitor the quality of the corporate (including and integrating both financial and sustainability) reporting process as well as the quality of financial statements audit and sustainability assurance. In order to achieve this, they should collectively have the necessary competence in relevant areas such as climate, environmental science, digitization and industry risks.

However, we strongly disagree with option c: the board as a whole is responsible for the quality and reliability corporate reporting. Elevating the responsibility of a single or a few board members may actually

educe	the	necessarv	engagement	of	the	other	board	members	on	this	topic.

#### Part III - Statutory audit

The overall objective of statutory audits is to ensure that financial statements are free from material misstatements and provide a true and fair view. The auditor has to identify and assess the risk of material misstatements and gather sufficient and appropriate audit evidence as the basis for his opinion that the financial statements provide a true and fair view and to publicly report on the results of his audit work. The EU audit rules promote audit quality and seek to ensure the independence of auditors and audit firms.

Therefore, the final objective of statutory audit is to contribute to the quality and reliability of financial statements of companies.

Question 10. How do you assess the effectiveness, efficiency and the coherence with other relevant EU frameworks of the key features of EU audit legislation in so far as it applies to PIE auditors and audit firms?

### a) The rules on independence of auditors/audit firms and absence of conflicts of interest

	<b>1</b> (very low)	2 (low)	3 (medium)	4 (high)	5 (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness in reaching its objectives	•	•	•	•	•	•
II. Efficiency: has the framework been cost efficient	•	•	•	•	•	•
III. Coherence with relevant EU rules	0	•	•	0	0	•

b)	The	rules	on the	content	of the	audit and	of th	e audit	report
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			Don't know -

	(very low)	2 (low)	3 (medium)	4 (high)	5 (very high)	No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness in reaching its objectives	•	•	•	•	•	•
II. Efficiency: has the framework been cost efficient	•	•	•	•	•	•
III. Coherence with relevant EU rules	0	0	•	0	0	0

#### c) The rules applicable to non-audit services

	<b>1</b> (very low)	2 (low)	3 (medium)	4 (high)	5 (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness in reaching its objectives	0	•	0	0	0	•
II. Efficiency: has the framework been cost efficient	•	•	•	•	•	•
III. Coherence with relevant EU rules	0	•	0	0	0	0

#### d) The rules on auditor/audit firm rotation

			Don't
			know -

	1 (very low)	2 (low)	3 (medium)	4 (high)	5 (very high)	No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness in reaching its objectives	0	•	•	0	0	•
II. Efficiency: has the framework been cost efficient	•	•	•	•	•	•
III. Coherence with relevant EU rules	•	0	•	0	0	0

# e) The rules on transparency (transparency report, additional reports to other parties / audit committees / supervisors)

	1 (very low)	2 (low)	3 (medium)	4 (high)	5 (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness in reaching its objectives	•	0	0	•	0	•
II. Efficiency: has the framework been cost efficient	•		•	•	•	•
III. Coherence with relevant EU rules	•	0	0	•	0	•

Question 11. Please describe the main issues you see, if any, in the audit pillar and, where possible, please provide concrete examples and evidence supporting your assessment.

You may want to consider the following aspects

- are there factors that have reduced the effectiveness / rendered the relevant EU framework less effective than anticipated? Which rules have proven less effective than anticipated?
- is there scope to improve efficiency via further simplification?
- are existing provisions coherent with each other?

2000 character(s) maximum

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

Auditor independence has already been stipulated strictly by the EU legislation and IESBA Code of Ethics. The same applies to the provision of non-audit services to PIE audit clients.

There are established and well-functioning procedures safeguarding the auditor's independence while providing non-audit services. Non-audit services do not compromise audit quality, either – vice versa, providing non-audit services under the safeguards, gives the auditor valuable understanding of the entity and its operations. Auditors provide other assurance services to meet stakeholders' valid expectations and emerging requirements. There is a need to clarify what non-audit services might cause independence issues and hence should continue to be dealt with from that perspective. Today, non-audit services include not only advisory services but also all other assurance services than statutory audits. Such services, e.g. sustainability assurance and assurance according to ESEF are often closely linked to financial statements audit and third parties take comfort from auditor's involvement. Assurance services do not compromise auditor's independence and thus should be excluded from cap calculations as per Article 4 of the Audit Regulation. In addition, auditors should be permitted to provide services that are closely linked to audit subject to existing independence rules. To try to meet expectations gaps, especially regarding fraud and going concern, and depending on any amendments in relation to managements responsibilities, there might be a need to further explore changes in both the audit scope and the audit report.

Currently, audit reports are seen as comparable, which is an important factor for capital markets and investors. However, the informational value of audit reports could be enhanced by adding audit and company specific information.

The rulings applicable to auditor rotation could be simplified, but no additional rulings needed since already stipulated heavily.

### Question 12. To which extent you agree to the following statements?

	<b>1</b> (strongly disagree)	2 (rather disagree)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather agree)	5 (strongly agree)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Statutory audits contribute as much as is possible to the quality and reliability of corporate reporting by PIEs	•	•	0	0	•	•
II. I am satisfied with the role of the statutory auditors / audit firms of PIEs	•	•	0	•	0	•
III. The work of auditors is reliable so I trust their assessment and reports and their work inspires trust in capital markets	•	•	0	0	•	•
IV. There is not enough choice for public interest entities in finding an audit firm at appropriate costs	•	0	0	0	0	•
V. Joint audits contribute to the quality of audit	0	•	0	0	0	0

# 12.1 If you want to add any comments, and/or mention specific issues you see you can insert them here. Where possible, please provide concrete examples and evidence supporting your assessment:

2000 character(s) maximum

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

The reporting entities are responsible for the quality of their corporate reporting at first hand. However, statutory audits contribute to the quality and reliability of corporate reporting. We acknowledge that the role of the auditor is evolving and can be even wider, for example relating to sustainability assurance or directors' statement on internal controls, fraud and going concern.

In Finland, joint audits are already possible but not widely used, which can be seen as a choice from the market. Locally, EU PIEs are not significant in terms of size (mainly small finance institutions). Also from audit quality perspective, there is no evidence joint audits would have had an impact on audit quality.

Therefore, we do not see mandating joint audits as an effective measure to either open the audit market or increase audit quality.

We welcome measures that aim to increase choice and capacity in the PIE audit market noting that substantive change in the market structure is likely to take place in the long term and will likely require a combination of measures. This, however, requires further evidence and detailed assessment on the effects those measures could have also at local, national level, considering local market structure and local market practices.

The audit quality issues that occur most often at EU level are

- deficiencies in audit firms' internal quality control systems
- the lack of, or inappropriate, monitoring of high-risk audited entities
- and the lack of audit evidence and documentation.

### Question 13. To what extent can these quality issues be attributed to deficiencies in the EU legal and supervisory framework for statutory audit?

- 1 Not at all
- 2 To a limited extent
- 3 To some extent
- 4 To a large extent
- 5 To a very large extent
- Don't know / no opinion / not applicable

### Question 13.1 Please explain, and where possible, provide evidence for your assessment under question 13:

2000 character(s) maximum

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

Like Accountancy Europe, we believe that the quality issues cannot be fixed solely by the introduction of more or more stringent regulation. It should be considered that most audits are in fact of adequate quality and therefore any measures aimed at improving the quality of audits should be proportionate and take into account the efficiency aspect as well as any potential consequences on other matters such as auditor choice in the already highly regulated PIE market.

To enhance the quality of audits for the future, we believe that the educational and remedial aspect of inspections needs to be enhanced. Inspection reports should always include information on what should have been done (differently) to ensure this, i.e., constructive comments to help the auditors and audit firms develop and improve. Overall, the system of supervision should not focus only on compliance with requirements such as on documentation and/or on punishment. Instead, it should consider the auditor's use of professional judgement and focus on ensuring creation of an environment that warrants a learning experience and development of the audit profession.

Question 14. How effective and efficient would the following actions be in increasing the quality of statutory audits of PIEs?

a) Ask auditors to disclose how they have assured the directors' statement on material fraud, and what steps they have taken to assess the effectiveness of the relevant internal controls and to detect any fraud

	not at all effective/efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	0	0	•	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	0	•	0	0

### b) Strengthen the informational value of audit reports

	not at all effective/efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	0	0	•	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	•	0	0	0

### c) Improve the internal governance of audit firms

	not at all effective/efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	0	0	•	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	0	0	0	•

# d) Incentivise or mandate the performance of joint audits for PIEs, including to enhance competition on the PIE audit market

	not at all effective/efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	•	0	0	0	0	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	•	0	0	0	0	0

### e) Further harmonise the rules on mandatory rotation

	(not at all effective/efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	•	0	0	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	•	0	0	0

### f) Limit the scope for statutory auditors and audit firms to provide non-audit services

	(not at all effective/ efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	•	0	0	0	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	•	0	0	0	0

### g) Increase or eliminate caps on auditor liability, at least for cases of gross negligence of statutory auditors

	not at all effective/efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	0	0	0	•
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	0	0	0	•

# h) Limit the number of Member State options in the EU Audit framework to ensure consistency across the EU and to incentivise cross-border statutory audits

	not at all effective/efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	•	0	0	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	•	0	0	0

i) The creation of a passporting system for PIE auditors and audit firms, allowing auditors to provide their services across the Union based on their approval in a Member State

	not at all effective/efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	•	0	0	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	•	0	0	0	0

Question 14.1 Have you identified other actions that would effectively and efficiently increase the quality and reliability of statutory audits of PIEs?

- Yes
- No
- Don't know / no opinion / not applicable

Question 14.2 Please provide any details to support your views. Any evidence, including on expected benefits and costs of such action is welcome:

2000 character(s) maximum

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

- a) As stated in our response in q12.1, we see evolving the role of statutory auditor as positive development. However, it should be emphasized that similarly to audit of FS, also assurance of internal control system, fraud and going concern should similarly affect the responsibilities and statements of the company reporting, which is then subject to assurance/ audit of statutory auditor.
- b) Currently, audit reports are seen as comparable, which is an important factor for capital markets and investors. However, the informational value of audit reports could be enhanced by adding audit and company specific information.
- c) We believe that improving internal governance as part of implementing ISQM1 at the audit firm level will benefit audit quality.
- d) In Finland, joint audits are already possible but not widely used, which can be seen as a choice from the market. Locally, EU PIE: s (other than listed companies) are not significant in terms of size (mainly small finance institutions). Also from audit quality perspective, there is no evidence joint audits would have had an impact on audit quality. Therefore, we do not see mandating joint audits as an effective measure to either open the audit market or increase audit quality.
- e) The rulings applicable to auditor rotation could be harmonized and simplified, but no additional rulings needed since already stipulated heavily. The question is in a close connection to independence and relating provisions and therefore covered also through those.
- f) We refer to our response relating to question 11.
- g) Not applicable, there are no caps for auditor liability in Finland.

#### Part IV - Supervision of PIE statutory auditors and audit firms

National competent authorities are responsible for the approval and registration of statutory auditors and audit firms, the adoption of audit standards, quality assurance and investigative and administrative disciplinary systems.

At European level, the cooperation between competent authorities is organised within the framework of the <u>Committee</u> <u>of European Audit Oversight Bodies (the 'CEAOB')</u>. The CEAOB has different tasks aimed at supervisory convergence, but it has no power to take binding decisions (Article 30 <u>Audit Regulation</u>).

Question 15. How do you assess the effectiveness, efficiency, and coherence of the key features of the EU supervisory framework for PIE statutory auditors and audit firms?

#### a) The supervision of PIE statutory auditors and audit firms in the EU

	1 (very low)	2 (low)	3 (medium)	4 (high)	5 (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness in reaching its objectives	•	•	•	•	•	•
II. Efficiency: has the framework been cost efficient	•	•	•	•	•	•
III. Coherence with relevant EU rules	0	0	•	0	0	•

#### b) The establishment and operation of national audit oversight bodies

	<b>1</b> (very low)	2 (low)	3 (medium)	4 (high)	5 (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness in reaching its objectives	0	0	•	0	•	•
II. Efficiency: has the	0	0	•	0	•	•

framework been cost efficient						
III. Coherence with relevant EU rules	•	•	•	•	•	0

#### c) The Member State systems for investigations and sanctions

	1 (very low)	2 (low)	3 (medium)	4 (high)	5 (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness in reaching its objectives	0	0	•	0	0	0
II. Efficiency: has the framework been cost efficient	•	•	•	•	•	•
III. Coherence with relevant EU rules	•	•	•	0	0	•

### d) The role of the CEAOB

	<b>1</b> (very low)	2 (low)	3 (medium)	4 (high)	<b>5</b> (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness in reaching its objectives	•	•	•	•	•	0
II. Efficiency: has the						

framework been cost efficient	0	0	0	0	0	•
III. Coherence with relevant EU rules	•	0	•	0	0	•

Question 15.1 Please describe the main issues you see, if any, in relation to the supervision of statutory auditors and audit firms and, where possible, please provide concrete examples and evidence supporting your assessment. You may want to consider the following aspects

- are there factors that have reduced the effectiveness / rendered the relevant EU framework less effective than anticipated? Which rules have proven less effective than anticipated?
- is there scope to improve efficiency via further simplification?
- are existing provisions coherent with each other?

2000 character(s) maximum

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

ST thinks that the supervision of statutory auditors works rather well in Finland. As a result of EU legislation (directive and regulation) supervision was totally reorganized from the beginning of year 2016. Supervision is not any more arranged by chamber of commerce but now it is fully under governmental administration and independent from audit field.

Even though ST is quite happy with the supervision, ST would be even happier if the supervision had more educational and couching touch. ST thinks that in that way the supervision of auditors could improve more audit quality. ST also thinks that the supervisor should also be able to say in advance what is an adequate level of audit.

ST sees that these useful arrangements supervision of auditors in Finland can do with their internal choices and priorities.

Question 16. Considering the findings in the <u>Commission monitoring report</u> and reports of national audit oversight bodies how would you rate the quality of audit supervision?

1 - Very low

	2 - Low
0	3 - Medium
0	4 - High
0	5 - Very high
	Don't know / no opinion / not applicable

2000 character(s) maximum

16.1 If you want to add any comments and/or provide evidence for your assessment in question 16, you can provide it below. You may also include the consequences that your assessment of the quality of audit supervision or the lack thereof has:

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

See answer to Q 15.

Question 17. How effective and efficient would the following actions be to increase the quality and effectiveness of supervision of PIE statutory auditors and audit firms?

#### a) Ensure better the independence and appropriate resources of supervisors of auditors and audit firms

	not at all effective/efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	0	•	0	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	0	•	0	0

### b) Increase the transparency of audit supervisors

	not at all effective/efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	0	0	•	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	0	0	•	0

### c) Increase the consistency of supervision of cross-border networks of audit firms

	not at all effective/efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	0	•	0	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	0	•	0	0

### d) Ensure supervision of audit committees

	not at all effective/efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	0	0	•	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	0	•	0	0

### e) Harmonise and strengthen the investigation and sanctioning powers of audit supervisors

	(not at all effective/efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	•	0	0	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	•	0	0	0

# f) Ensure that at European level there are legal instruments available that ensure supervisory convergence as regards statutory audit of PIEs

	not at all effective/efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	0	0	•	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	0	0	•	0

#### g) Grant a European body the task to register and supervise PIE statutory auditors and audit firms

	not at all effective/efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	•	0	0	0	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	•	0	0	0	0

Question 17.1 Have you identified other actions that would effectively and efficiently increase the quality and reliability of supervision of PIE statutory auditors and audit firms?

- Yes
- No
- Don't know / no opinion / not applicable

# Question 17.2 Please provide any details to support your views. Any evidence, including on expected benefits and costs of such action is welcome:

2000 character(s) maximum

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

The audit market in Finland is rather small compared to other countries. This is consequence of market structure in Finland. Overall companies in Finland are quite small. Even most of our listed companies are rather small, of course with some exemption.

ST sees that national size of audit market should be reflected in national supervisory authority's power and we see no benefits setting up a European Supervisory Authority.

Also, legal environment in Finland differs from some other countries. We have no had massive financial crimes, frauds, audit crimes or other scandals in Finland which would support or justify the need of European Supervisory Authority.

#### Part V - Supervision and enforcement of corporate reporting

The supervision and enforcement of corporate reporting refers to the examination by competent authorities of listed companies' compliance with the disclosure obligations stemming from the applicable reporting framework, as well as taking appropriate measures when infringements are identified.

Based on enforcement activities by national competent authorities, ESMA reports a significant level of material misstatements. In the follow up of the Wirecard case and based on its experience, ESMA recommended a number of actions to improve the enforcement of corporate reporting (see ESMA letter of 26 February 2021 to the Commissioner McGuinness on next steps following Wirecard - ESMA32-51-818).


The Transparency Directive includes a number of requirements relating to supervision of corporate reporting

- the designation of a central competent authority in each Member State. For the enforcement of corporate reporting, Member States may designate a competent authority other than the central authority and/or delegate tasks to other entities
- national central competent authorities must be independent from market participants. There are no specific provisions as regards the independence of other designated authorities. As regards entities with delegated tasks, the entity in question must be organised in a manner such that conflicts of interest are avoided and information obtained from carrying out the delegated tasks is not used unfairly or to prevent competition
- Member States must provide competent authorities with certain powers, including investigative powers

ESMA is tasked to foster supervisory convergence as regards the enforcement of financial statements prepared
in accordance with the IFRS. For this purpose it has adopted in <u>2014 guidelines on the enforcement of financial</u>
information

This part of the consultation complements the <u>Commission targeted consultation on the supervisory convergence and the Single Rulebook</u> from 12 March 2021 to 21 May 2021.

Question 18. Considering the level of material departures from IFRS in the financial statements of listed companies found in the <u>ESMA report on enforcement and regulatory activities of European enforcers in 2020</u>, how would you rate (on a scale of 1 to 5) the degree to which such departures can be attributed to deficiencies in the EU supervisory framework?



18.1 If you want to add any comments and/or provide evidence for your assessment in question 18, you can provide it below. You may also include the consequences that your assessment of the quality of audit supervision or the lack thereof has:

2000 character(s) maximum

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

- ESMA research area is limited too much to get an
- scoped out relevant issues that may have resulted in different result. ei luotettavia result no long reaching

Question 19. How effective and efficient would the following actions be in increasing the quality and reliability of reporting by listed companies?

a) Clarify the role and responsibilities of the national authorities charged with the enforcement of corporate reporting and entities to whom the supervision of corporate reporting is delegated/designated, and improve their cooperation

	not at all effective/efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	0	0	•	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	0	0	•	0

### b) Improve the system for the exchange of information between authorities and entities involved in the supervision of corporate reporting, and other relevant national authorities

	not at all effective/efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	0	•	0	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	0	•	0	0

# c) Strengthen the rules ensuring the independence of national authorities or entities involved in the supervision of corporate reporting

	not at all effective/efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	0	0	•	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	0	0	•	0

#### d) Increase the resources of national authorities or entities involved in the supervision of corporate reporting

	not at all effective/efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	0	0	•	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	0	•	0	0

e) Increase the powers for national competent authorities to enforce corporate reporting, such as forensic, powers to obtain any necessary information from banks, tax or any other authorities in the country, powers to request information and corrective actions, etc.

	not at all effective/efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	•	0	0	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	•	0	0	0

#### f) Improve cooperation and coordination between national authorities of different Member States

	(not at all effective/efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	0	•	0	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	0	•	0	0

#### g) Increase transparency on the conduct and results of enforcement activities by national authorities

	not at all effective/efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	0	0	•	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	0	0	•	0

### h) Strengthen the role of ESMA on the enforcement of corporate reporting

	not at all effective/efficient)	(rather not effective/efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	(very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	0	0	•	0	0	0
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	0	0	•	0	0	0

Question 19.1 Have you identified other actions that would effectively and efficiently increase the quality and reliability of reporting by listed companies?

- Yes
- No
- Don't know / no opinion / not applicable

Question 19.2 Please provide any details to support your views. Any evidence, including on expected benefits and costs of such action is welcome:

2000 character(s) maximum

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

Worth considering would be the investors opportunity to undertake in exceptional circumstances a dialogue with the external auditor of a listed company. This is currently not possible. Such engagement meeting should be attended by a representative of the company in question. Such an engagement dialogue should definitely increase the external auditor's accountability towards shareholders and may incentivise the quality of their audit activities.

Hence, sustainability reporting also shall be supervised in the near future, the interconnectivity between financial and sustainability reporting, will stress the NCAs enforcing policies and activities even more. This means national authorities will soon need more resources and guidance on supervising sustainability information, including the nature of sanctions to be exercised in case of breaches.

#### **Additional information**

Should you wish to provide additional information (e.g. a position paper, report) or raise specific points not covered by the questionnaire, you can upload your additional document(s) below. Please make sure you do not include any personal data in the file you upload if you want to remain anonymous.

The maximum file size is 1 MB.

You can upload several files.

Only files of the type pdf,txt,doc,docx,odt,rtf are allowed

#### **Useful links**

More on this consultation (https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/finance-consultations-2021-corporate-reporting\_
Consultation document (https://ec.europa.eu/info/files/2021-corporate-reporting-consultation-document\_en)
Consultation strategy (https://ec.europa.eu/info/files/2021-corporate-reporting-consultation-strategy\_en)
More on company reporting (https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/company-reporting-and-auditing\_e
Specific privacy statement (https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/specific-privacy-statement\_en)
More on the Transparency register (http://ec.europa.eu/transparencyregister/public/homePage.do?locale=en)

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